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Abstract
In this paper we argue that democracies tend to run (larger)current account deﬁcits than
autocracies. Our argument is based on the diﬀerent incentives faced by democratic and
autocratic leaders. The main theoretical hypothesis are tested on a dataset that consists of
121 countries over the period 1980-2012, using ﬁve year averages and a ﬁxed eﬀects panel
data model. The empirical ﬁndings suggest that autocracies run lower current account deﬁcits
than democracies. Special focus is given in the issue of endogeneity by estimating an IV Fixed
Eﬀects model, using as instruments of Democracy the share of Christian adherents in each
country and also the level of democracy in neighboring countries. These results are found to
be robust across alternative empirical speciﬁcations.
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21. Introduction
There is a huge literature analyzing the determinants of current account imbalances
(Chinn and Prasad,2003; Chinn and Ito, 2007; Imam, 2007; Endegnanew et al., 2012; Gru-
ber and Kamin, 2005 etc). Most of these studies ﬁnd that economic factors such as the net
foreign asset position, the budget balance, the real eﬀective exchange rate and the economic
openness of the country aﬀect the current account position. This literature however seems
to ignore the political institutions that may shape the external balance of the economy. In
the present paper we try to examine these forces, by establishing a link between current
account deﬁcits and the political regime type. Speciﬁcally we argue and empirically establish
a relationship between the level of democracy and the current account deﬁcit and show that
more autocratic regimes deliver lower current account deﬁcits than do democratic ones.
The eﬀect of democracy on the external sector of the economy, has been a subject of
research for a number of papers. For example Harms and Ursprung (2002), Adam and
Filippaios (2007) and others, examine the eﬀect of democracy on the ﬂow of Foreign Direct
Investments. The general ﬁnding is that democracy increases FDI as long as FDI are not
targeted towards the extraction of natural resources (Asiedu and Lien, 2011). Similarly there
is a vast literature which examines the eﬀect of democracy on trade. For example Milner
and Kubota (2005) and O'Rourke and Taylor (2006) ﬁnd that democratization results into
more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade. On the
other hand Yu (2010), using a gravity model of trade ﬁnd that democracy increases exports
as it improves the quality of the exportables. This eﬀect might dominate the negative eﬀect
of democracy on trade policies and overall it may be the case that democracy increases
trade ﬂows. The present paper is related to this literature, however it examines the eﬀect
of the political regime on the current account balance instead of focusing on just one of its
components. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper that examines this relationship.
Since democracy aﬀects the international ﬂow of goods and capital it is natural to expect
3that it will also aﬀect the overall current account position. In Section 2 we justify theoret-
ically our empirical model and derive our main testable hypothesis, i.e. that democracies
tend to run (larger) current account deﬁcits. Our arguments are as follows: Firstly, follow-
ing Anderson(1988), we expect that dictators are immune from public pressures relatively
to democratically elected politicians. Therefore they are more able to temporary increase
taxes or reduce the government expenditures without facing severe opposition by the gen-
eral public. This implies that current account consolidations are more easily achieved in an
autocratic environment. Secondly, as autocracies tend to be less safe for foreign investment
the supply of foreign capital will tend to be lower. And even when there is high capital
inﬂow this can be rather threatening for the survival of the regime (Kalyvitis and Vlachaki,
2012): increased holdings of capital by foreigners will result into pressures on the dictator
for democratization. Consequently, dictators that fear such foreign pressures will try to use
policies that keep the current account balanced in order to decrease the reliance on net for-
eign assets. Finally, following Rodrik (1999) we expect democracies to pay higher wages than
autocracies. This results into a real eﬀective exchange rate appreciation and consequently
higher current account deﬁcits.
In order to examine empirically the above theoretical hypotheses and to establish a causal
relationship between democracy and the current account balance we estimate a Fixed Eﬀects
panel model. Our sample consists of 121 countries over the period 1980-2012. All variables
are expressed as ﬁve year averages in order to eliminate the eﬀect of short run ﬂuctuations,
and examine the long run causal eﬀects of the political regime. The dependent variable is
the current account balance as percent of GDP and the rest of the explanatory variables are
similar to Chinn and Prassad (2003). The main proxy of democracy is the Polity IV index
of democracy, which provides the coding of the authority characteristics of states around the
world and calculates various measures of how a country is governed from 1800 (or the year
that the state gained its independence) onwards. To examine the robustness of our results
4we also employ the Freedom House index of democracy, which provides an index of the civil
and political freedoms allowed by the political regime. Our main ﬁnding is that autocracies
run lower current account deﬁcits than democracies.
To get a ﬁrst insight about the relationship between current account deﬁcits and democ-
racy, we present Figure 1. This ﬁgure depicts the dynamics of the current account balance
after an one (blue line) or two point (red line) increase in the Polity IV index. The ﬁgure
indicates that after an increase in the level of democracy at time zero, there is an associated
decline on the average, across countries, current account balance for up to ten years onwards.
Even though the results of this graph are suggestive about an important negative eﬀect of
democracy on the current account balance, they do not capture the eﬀect of other macroe-
conomic variables, or country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover the ﬁgure shows that the long
run eﬀect of a change in democracy is much larger than the short run one. For these reasons
our empirical results rely on a Fixed Eﬀects panel model on ﬁve year averages.
To further strengthen our results, we also provide a series of robustness checks in order to
verify that the empirical results are robust to the country sample employed and the estimation
method. As we are interested in the causal relationship between democracy and the current
account balance we also perform an instrumental variable analysis so as to eliminate the
existence of possible endogeneity. We use two instruments. Our ﬁrst instrument is the share
of Christian adherents in each country; according to Huntington (1993) Christianity played
a key role on the democratization process during the previous years. This correlation is
evident from just the simple correlation of the instrument with democracy (almost 50%). At
the same time our data reveal a virtually zero correlation with the current account balance
(correlation coeﬃcient 0.001). Moreover following Persson and Tabellini (2009) we use the
average weighted democracy index of each country's neighbors. Following the literature we
expect a positive association between the Polity score of a country with its neighbors. This
is consistent with the democratization waves theory of Huntington (1993) and the regional
5Figure 1: The eﬀect of a change in democracy on the Current Account Balance
clusters of democracy and autocracy observed by Persson and Tabellini (2009).
The Instrumental Variables analysis veriﬁes the negative relationship between Democracy
and Current Account balance while in the ﬁrst stage we ﬁnd a positive relationship between
Christianity, Regioanl Democracy and the Polity variable. At the same time all relevant test
indicate that our instruments are valid. Furthermore a standard Durbin- Wu- Hausman test
indicates weak evidence against the exogeneity of the democracy variable. We can therefore
conclude that our results are robust. Finally, in the robustness section we perform a number
of additional tests, which verify the theoretical channels through which democracy aﬀect the
current account balance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we elaborate on our hypothesis
that more autocratic regimes face lower current account deﬁcits relatively to more democratic.
In Section 3 we introduce the empirical methodology and the data. In Section 4 we present
6our empirical results. In Section 5 we present the results of the instrumental variable analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
In this section we try to explore the channel via which democracy aﬀects the current
account balance. We also explain why autocracies tend to run lower current account deﬁcits
relatively to democracies.
According to Anderson(1989) autocracies are less sensitive to public pressures relative to
democratic elected governments. Therefore they are more likely to follow unpopular policies
compared to their democratic counterparts. Following the literature on the economics of
dictatorship (e.g. Wintrobe, 1998, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) we conceive the dictator
to be maximizing a weighted social utility function which places more weight to an elite.
In contrast a democratic elected government, wishes to be re- elected and thus places more
weight on the wishes of the majority of the population (Acemoglu and Robinson , 2005). The
underlying mechanism behind this eﬀect stems from the fact that the cost of overthrowing
a government in a democracy is lower than the associated cost in an autocracy, as the cost
of voting is lower than the cost of a revolution. 2 Therefore democratic governments face
more constraints in their choice of policies. Similarly Brough and Kimenyi (1986), argue
that the time horizon of a typical dictator is longer than that of a democratically elected
politician. These eﬀects have been veriﬁed in the empirical literature. For example Aidt
and Jensen (2013) show that democratization leads to higher public spending. Similarly,
Amin and Djankov (2014) show that authoritarian regimes may undertake reforms that are
painful as they do not worry about the public opinion. This is consistent also with some
2This rests on the collective action problem introduced by Olson (1965) and extended by Tullock (1971)
which applies it in revolution activities. If someone takes part in a revolution he faces a direct cost of eﬀort.
He also faces two indirect costs. The ﬁrst one is the danger of taking part in illegal activities and the second
is an opportunity cost as he does not work and takes part in the revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
7historical accounts, as the case of the Ceausescu regime in 1985 Romania- where strong
austerity measures were introduced in order to fully repay all external debt.3
The above imply that dictators can more easily impose the strict ﬁscal measures that a
current consolidation requires. And even when currency depreciations are required in order
to correct current account deﬁcits, democratically elected governments also face huge losses
in political support. According to Frankel (2005) , large currency depreciations are associated
with loss of support to the government, and higher probability of losing the elections.
What this discussion reveals is the tendency of the democratically elected governments
to avoid large current account consolidations and delay them until after the elections, or
after a new party comes into power ( Alesina and Drazen, 1991). In contrast there are no
such motives for dictators: they can easily impose ﬁscal measures or allow a large currency
depreciation. Therefore, current account imbalances are not expected to exist for a large
period of time in autocracies, as they are corrected more easily than in democracies. In other
words we expect democracies to run larger current account deﬁcits than dictatorships.
And even though dictators can more easily correct current account imbalances, they have
also more to fear from foreign indebtedness, either in the form of holdings of government
bonds or more importantly foreign investment in the home economy. The accumulation of
foreign assets leads to increased political power of the foreigners which hold these assets
(see Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, 2011). Since typically democracies pressure autocracies in order
to democratize (Levitsky and Way,2010), dictators will not fare well with this increase in
foreign power within the country. And as long as they can correct external imbalances
either through ﬁscal measures or currency depreciation, they would refrain from large and
3These measures included for example the full exporting of all Romania's agricultural goods, which of
course led to huge decline in the standard of living of the whole population (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001). In our
sample the average current account balance over GDP for Romania before democratization run on 1.61%,
implying a non negligible current account surplus. After the fall of communism and the democratization of
the country the respective number to -6.12%. Even if we take the years after 2000, when democracy appears
more consolidated, the average current account deﬁcit in Romania is 1.41% of GDP.
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even if dictators have nothing to fear from the accumulation of foreign assets, it can be
the case that sovereign lending markets imperfections may prevent domestic borrowing. In
this case it is no the decision of the dictator not accumulate foreign debt, but the lower
creditworthiness that constraints dictatorships from borrowing. Democracies tend to exhibit
higher stability (see e.g. Feng , 1997 ), better protect property rights (see e.g.; Roe and Siegel,
2008 Acemoglu et al. [2]) and have more developed ﬁnanacial markets (e.g. Bhattacharyy,
1993). Democracies then are a safer place for foreign investment than dictatorships and are
more able to attract foreign capital. For example, many foreigners want to invest in the
United States, both in private capital markets and by buying government bonds, because
they are safer than investing where property rights are poorly protected. In all cases the end
result is the same, i.e. dictatorships will run lower current account deﬁcits.
The above argument can be related to a long standing hypothesis that globalization
promotes the diﬀusion of democratic ideas (Shumpeter,1950; Lipset, 1959; Kant, 1975 ;
Hayek 1978). Recent evidence verify this relationship between openness and democracy,
especially during the third wave of democratization (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008).
According to this view, free trade and capital ﬂows raise incomes and economic development,
which in eﬀect foster democratization by enhancing the eﬃciency of the resource allocation.
Therefore there are reasons to expect that autocratic regimes will favor restrictions to trade
and capital ﬂows and lower exposure to the global markets.
Finally, Rodrik (1999) has shown that typically democracies pay higher wages than non-
democracies. This occurs as in democracies, the bargaining power of workers is higher rel-
atively to the associated bargaining power in autocracies. As a consequence, the prices of
domestically produced products in democratic countries are higher resulting into a real eﬀec-
tive exchange rate appreciation. This ultimately suggest that ceteris paribus it is expected
that democracies will tend to have larger trade deﬁcits.
9All the above arguments point to the same theoretical hypothesis to be tested in the
empirical section, i.e. democracies run higher current account deﬁcits than autocracies. The
sections that follow establish that this is indeed the case.
3. Data
Our sample consists of 121 countries over the 1980- 2012 period. All variables are ex-
pressed in ﬁve year averages in order to eliminate the eﬀect of short run ﬂuctuations. This
sample of 121 countries, include all countries for which data are available, excluding coun-
tries with an average (over the whole period) population of less than 2 million. According to
Endegnanew et al. (2012), micro-states display large changes in their current account balance
which are not related to changes in economic policy but to the external environment, and
thus their current account is aﬀected by other variables than larger countries.
Our dependent variable is current account balance as percent of GDP (cabi,t), as taken
from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database.4
Our main variable of interest is the Democracy variable which captures the level of
democracy in each country. This variable is taken from the Polity IV database. The Polity
democracy index focuses on the institutional structure of the political regime. The variable
Democracy takes values from -10 to 10. A score of Democracy equal to -10 (+10) indicates
a strongly autocratic (democratic) state. According to Polity IV, a democratic state has
three essential characteristics. First, the political participation is fully competitive; second,
institutionalized constraints on executive power are present; and third, civil liberties are
secured. In contrast, an absence of these three characteristics typiﬁes an autocratic country.
According to our theoretical priors set in the previous section, we expect the sign of this
variable to be negative as we believe that more democratic countries tend to have higher
current account deﬁcits. To verify that our results are not driven by the choice of the
4Positive values of the variable imply current account surplus whereas negative ones imply deﬁcit.
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democracy index, we examine the robustness of our results when we use the the Gastil
democracy index (Freedom House, 2015). The diﬀerence between the Polity and the Freedom
House indices is that the latter places more emphasis on the political and civil liberties and,
therefore, it deﬁnes democracy in a rather non-minimalist way.
To correctly specify our model we use a series of control variables consistent with the
relevant literature (Chinn and Prassad 2003; Gruber and Kamin 2005; Chinn and Ito, 2007
; Imam 2007 ;Endegnanew et al., 2012)
First of all, we use as proxy for the ﬁscal balance the Cyclically AdjustedBudgetBalance.To
this end we take the component of the Expenditure and Revenues (as percent of GDP) which
are not explained by the growth rate of the economy or a time trend. These data are ob-
tained from IMF's, World Economic Outlook. Then, our variable is deﬁned as the ratio
of the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenue (percent of GDP) minus the Change in the
Cyclically Adjusted Expenditure (percent of GDP). According to Endegnanew et al.(2012)
cyclical adjusted values are included in order to eliminate the common reaction to the busi-
ness cycle. Following the twin deﬁcits hypothesis we expect the sign of this variable to be
positive.
As the NetForeignAsset position is the accumulation of past current account balances,
we expect this variable to aﬀect the current account position (Gruber and Kamin,2005),
even though the sign of the variable is a- priori ambiguous. Economies with high Net Foreign
Assets can aﬀord to run trade deﬁcits longer which leads to lower current account balances.
On the other hand, a positive relationship may exist as higher Net Foreign Assets lead to
higher net income ﬂows (Imam, 2008). The variable is expressed as a share of GDP and is
taken from the World Bank.
Following Masson et al.(1998), and according to the standard life cycle model of savings,
we expect an increase in the share of the youth and elderly population dependency ratio to
lead to a ceteris paribus decrease on private savings. Therefore we use the Dependency Ratio
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which is the proportion of the population less than 18 years old plus population aged above
65 to total population. So we expect the sign of this variable to be negative as a reduction
in private saving reduces the current account balance.
As oil-exporting countries generally run large current account surpluses and accumu-
late foreign assets during the extractive stage in order to smooth consumption once the
non-renewable resources have been exhausted (Adam and Moutos, 2015), we introduce the
variable Oil Rents which measures the diﬀerence between the value of crude oil production
at world prices and the total costs of production as a share of GDP. We expect the sign to be
positive.5 Following Chinn and Prasad(2003), we use the variable Openness to Trade, deﬁned
as imports plus exports over GDP. This variable captures the fact that more open economies
have the capacity to service external debt. This happens as they can easily generate foreign
exchange earnings through exports. This leads to a higher current account balance. So we
expect the sign of this variable to be positive. The last three variables are taken from World
Bank's World Development Indicators Database.
We also use a proxy for ﬁnancial development by using the variablePrivateCredit as
% of GDP (also taken by World Bank's World Development Indicators Database ) as a
deviation of the world's average, as in Chinn and Ito (2007). The expected sign of this
variable depends on whether the saving glut or the ﬁnancial deepening hypothesis holds.
6 A positive relationship between private credit and the current account balance implies that
the ﬁnancial deepening hypothesis is correct. This happens as higher ﬁnancial deepening,
in the form of increased provision of ﬁnancial services or increased money supply, induces
5Since we found Oil Rents to be highly correlated with Democracy, we made the two variables orthogonal
by regressingDemocracy on the share of Oil Rents to GDP and use the residuals as the variableOil Rents.(For
the relationship between Oil endowments and dictatorship see also Crespo et al. (2011).
6According to Chinn and Ito (2007) A global saving glut argument views excess saving from Asian
emerging market countries, driven by rising saving and collapsing investment in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis (and to a lesser extent Europe), as the cause of the U.S. current account deﬁcit... (Chinn and Ito,
2007, page 248).The ﬁnancial deepening hypothesis on the other hand suggests that ﬁnancial development
leads to higher investment and thus lower current account deﬁcit.
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higher saving which eventually lead to current account surpluses. On the other hand a
negative relationship implies that the saving glut hypothesis, which states that current
account imbalances are the outcome of excessive surpluses from oil exporting countries or
savings from emerging market countries in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises, holds (Chinn and
Ito, 2007).
To control for changes in the price competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world, we use
the logarithm of the Real EffectiveExchangeRate (as in Endegnanew et al.,2012). The
sign of this variable is expected to be negative, as an increase in the real eﬀective exchange
rate implies a real depreciation which is expected to improve external balance. Similarly
we include the Real EffectiveExchangeRateV olatility , which is the 5- year standard
deviation in the Real EffectiveExchangeRate. Higher volatility might lead agents to save
more for precautionary reasons and also might lead economies to experience low investment.
So we expect a negative relationship between real eﬀective exchange rate volatility and current
account balance. The real eﬀective exchange rate data are taken from Darvas(2012).
To take into account the level of development of each country we use the Relative Real
GDP per capita of each country to the Average World real GDP per capita(Relative Income).
Standard neoclassical theory suggests that as long as capital is expected to ﬂow from rich to
poor countries, there must be a positive association between the current account balance and
the relative income. However according to the stages of development hypothesis countries
that move from a low to an intermediate level of development import capital and run current
account deﬁcits. Then after reaching a threshold level of development they become net
capital exporters, and run current account surpluses (Chinn and Ito, 2007). According to
this view we can expect a U shaped relationship- or even a negative relationship- between
cabi,tand relative income.
7 Similarly, we include the GrowthRateof the real GDP per capita
7In the tables that follow we present the results of a linear eﬀect of relative income on cabi,t. We have
estimated the same model with a squared term and found that the non- linear eﬀect turned out statistically
insigniﬁcant. As this does not aﬀect our main results we opted for a linear speciﬁcation regarding the relative
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as we believe that higher growth rates may result into expectations for higher future income,
which in turn raises current consumption and thus leads to a reduction to the current account
balance.
Finally we proxy for ﬁnancial openness using the variable constructed by Chinn and
Prassad (2001), which measures Financial Openness. Lower capital openness can have two
opposite eﬀects: limited access to international capital may lead to lower current account
deﬁcits. On the other hand however, restrictions to the ﬂow of capital would reﬂect attempts
to stave oﬀ the consequences of a legacy of chronic current deﬁcits. The variable is taken
from Chinn and Ito (2015)
Table 1 presents the analytical description of our data, data sources, the summary statis-
tics and also expected signs of all of our variables.
[Insert table 1 here]
The baseline speciﬁcation used to study the relationship between current account balance
and the political regime has the following form:
cabi,t = aconstant+ai+λt+b1polityi,t+b2nfai,t+b3cyclbbi,t+b4dependencyi,t+b5growthi,t+
b6oilrentsi,t+b7opennessi,t+b8pcrediti,t+b9reervoli,t+b10reeri,t+b11incomei,t+b12kaopeni,t+
ui,t (1)
where, cab is the current account balance of country i at time t, polity is the democracy
measure, nfa is the net foreign assets position, dependency is the dependency ratio, growth
is the growth rate, openness is the openness to trade, oilrents is the amount of oil rents,
pcredit is the private credit as percent of GDP, reervol is the real eﬀective exchange rate
volatility, reer is the log of real eﬀective exchange rate, income is the relative income and
kaopen is the ﬁnancial openness.The terms aiand λtdenote the country ﬁxed eﬀects and the
time ﬁxed eﬀects respectively. So as to be sure that we estimated the correct model, we
income variable.
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also estimate a random eﬀects model and apply a standard Hausman test which showed that
the correct speciﬁcation is the Fixed Eﬀects model.8 We also test whether the time eﬀects
are signiﬁcant by an F test and ﬁnd that the best model is with the one with time eﬀects.
Therefore our baseline model is a Fixed Eﬀects with country and time eﬀects. Finally as our
interest lies more of the medium to long run determinants of current account balances,we
estimate the model using ﬁve year averages as in Chinn and Ito (2008).
4. Empirical Results
We start by estimating equation (1), using the data and the empirical methodology out-
lined in the previous section. The results are reported in Table 2.
Column (1) presents the baseline speciﬁcation, where we estimate a panel data equation
with time and country ﬁxed eﬀects. As we can see the political regime has a strong negative
relationship with current account balance. This veriﬁes our theoretical priors, i.e. democra-
cies tend to run higher current account deﬁcits. Also, the coeﬃcient of the variable suggests
that the quantitative eﬀect of democracy on the current account balance in non- negligible:
an one standard deviation increase in Democracy,9 is associated with a 3% point decline in
the current account balance.
[Insert table 2 here]
Regarding the rest of the control variables, Private Credit (% of GDP) has also a negative
relationship and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on current account balance. This is consistent
with the saving glut hypothesis (Chinn and Ito, 2007) as highlighted in the previous section.
Similarly the Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the current
account balance at the 10% level of statistical signiﬁcance- suggesting that an increase in real
8The Hausman for Fixed versus Random Eﬀects is given in the last line of Table 2. The Random Eﬀects
model is clearly rejected in favor of the Fixed Eﬀects model.
9Which in our sample is equal to 6.6
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eﬀective exchange rate makes imports more expensive and exports cheaper and thus exerting
a negative eﬀect on the current account balance. Oil Rents also enter with an expected
positive and statistically signiﬁcant sign (at the 1% level of signiﬁcance), which suggests that
oil producing countries tend to run higher current account surpluses. This latter eﬀect is
quite large in size as an 1% increase in the oil rents is associated with an 1% higher current
account balance.
Relative income appears to have a negative eﬀect on current account balance. This eﬀect
is consistent with the stages of development hypothesis. However as this eﬀect is rather small
quantitatively, i.e. an 1% increase in the relative income for the country results in a 0.04%
reduction in the current account balance and not consistently signiﬁcant in all estimations,
we cannot place much conﬁdence in the result. Finally the budget balance has a strong
positive eﬀect on current account balance. This is consistent with a large number of papers
(see for example Bussiere and Fratzscher(2006);Ca' Zorzi and Rubaszek(2008) ) which ﬁnd a
positive association between current account balance and ﬁscal balance. As budget deﬁcits
redistribute income from future to current generations therefore resulting into capital inﬂows
and current account deﬁcits (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1994).
The rest of the variables are found to be statistically insigniﬁcant. However with the
exception of the variables Openness to Trade and Real ExchangeRate V olatility these vari-
ables have the expected signs.
In columns (2) to (5) of table 2 we re-estimate the baseline equation presented in column
(1): (i) without time eﬀects (column 2), (ii) assuming Random Eﬀects (column 3), (iii) using
a simple OLS (column 4) with time eﬀects, (iv) with OLS without time eﬀects (column 5).10
In all cases the eﬀect of Democracy on the current account balance remains negative and
statistically signiﬁcant (at least in the 10% level of statistical signiﬁcance). With respect to
10We have also estimated our baseline model in an annual dataset and found the same eﬀect of polity to
the 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance. These results are available from the authors.
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the rest of the variables the only important changes are in the PrivateCredit of GDPand
Relative Income, which both change signs and remain statistically signiﬁcant. The literature
so far has for both variables inconclusive results. What we ﬁnd here is that the empirical result
is heavily Dependent on the estimation method. However since the Fixed Eﬀects model is
(i) the correctly speciﬁed model according to the speciﬁcation tests and (ii) the Fixed Eﬀects
model by estimating the within variation in the data captures the causal relationship between
the independent and dependent variables (1) , we place more faith on the results of column
(1).
To further explore the robustness of our results, in Table 3 we re-estimate the baseline
Fixed Eﬀects equation by excluding countries that are a- priori expected to potentially aﬀect
our main ﬁnding.
[Insert table 3 here]
In columns (1) to (3) we examine whether the eﬀect of the regime on current account is
driven by the extreme values of Democracy in our sample. So in column (1) we estimate
our baseline equation by excluding from our sample countries that achieve a Polity IV score
of 10 or below -9. We do so since these are the extreme values of the Democracy index
in our sample.11 In column (2) we exclude only countries where their Polity IV score takes
the minimum value, i.e. -9 and ﬁnally in column (3) we exclude countries which achieve the
maximum Polity IV score, i.e. 10. As we can observe our main variable of interest remains
negative and statistically signiﬁcant to the 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance. Moreover most
of the variables retain their sign and signiﬁcance, with the exception of the real eﬀective
exchange rate and relative income variables which become insigniﬁcant. 12
In column (4) we estimate our model by excluding the richest and the poorest countries.
Speciﬁcally, we exclude countries with GDP per capita at the lowest and highest 10% (column
11There are no instances of countries with a polity score equal to -10.
12This may be attributed to the signiﬁcant decline in the observations.
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4) and 5% (column 5) in the sample. The reason we do this is that we want to reject
the probability that extreme values of GDP drive the result of the regime type on current
account balance. As we can observe Democracy remains statistically signiﬁcant to the 1%
level , which implies that our relationship is very strong. The other variables have similar
signs as in our baseline model except from slight diﬀerences which may occur because of the
change in observations. Finally, in column (6) we exclude countries which where communist
and democratized. We believe that in these countries current account deﬁcits are a result
of huge amounts of infrastructure investment and private consumption that was needed to
be ﬁnanced using foreign funds and goods. So , we want to be sure that our results are
not driven by those countries. It is obvious in column 6 that this does not happen. The
coeﬃcient of democracy remains statistically signiﬁcant to the 1% level.
In Table 4 we re-estimate our model by using additional control variables. In column (1)
we use the Freedom House index as proxy for democracy. We do that so as to ensure that
the eﬀect of the regime type on current account balance is not related with a speciﬁc variable
that captures democracy (in this case Polity IV) but remains if we use other measures of
democracy. As we can see, the eﬀect of democracy is again statistically signiﬁcant to the 1%
level and all the other variables have similar coeﬃcients and same signs as in our baseline
model13
[Insert table 4 here]
In columns (2) to (5) we re-estimate our model by using additional control variables. In
column (2) we replace the real eﬀective exchange rate volatility with terms of trade volatility
and in column (3) we estimate our model by using log GDP per capita instead of relative
income. In column (4) we use the debt as percent of GDP instead of cyclically adjusted ﬁscal
13The only exception to the above statement being the variables which measure the Real Eﬀective Exchange
Rate and the Private Credit as % of GDP.
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balance. Finally in column (5) we exclude from our sample all the oil exporting countries.
As we discussed earlier, the oil exporting economies face high current account surpluses
and accumulate foreign assets during the extractive stage in order to smooth consumption
once the non-renewable resources have been exhausted. For these economies the evolution
of the current account  in addition to being aﬀected by oil prices  may be aﬀected by
intended ﬂuctuations in their production in order to stabilize the global oil market rather than
any particular concern on their external position (IMF, 2013). Furthermore oil exporting
countries may face the eﬀect of the natural resource curse, which is associated with weak
institutions and excessive rent seeking (Torvik(2006), Robinson et al.(2006)). Therefore one
can claim that our results may be driven by this eﬀect. As we can observe, this is not
the case.14 In all ﬁve columns the eﬀect of the political regime on current account balance
remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
A ﬁnal robustness analysis is presented in Table 5, where we have performed a Jackknife
analysis (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). This method involves estimating the initial equation
by excluding in each replication one cross sectional unit (country). In Table 5 we report the
maximum and the minimum estimated coeﬃcients, as well as the excluded countries that
exert this extreme identiﬁed impact. Comparing these coeﬃcients with the ones presented in
Table 2 we can conclude that our results are robust to the exclusion of particular countries.
[Insert Table 5 here]
As the reader can easily verify the eﬀect of Democracy on the current account balance,
is not sensitive to the exclusion of a particular country from the sample, as the coeﬃcient
ranges from a -0.70 (with the exclusion of Indonesia) to -0.60 (with the exclusion of Sudan).
These two values are within the conﬁdence interval of the baseline results (column (1)- Ta-
ble2). Furthermore the variables that were found to be signiﬁcant in the baseline model,
14Although the coeﬃcient is half in size, we can't reject the hypothesis that the two coeﬃcients are not
equal because the estimated conﬁdence intervals are overlapping.
19
do not change signs in the Jackknife estimation. It is interesting also to note that the vari-
able Real ExchangeRate V olatilitywith the exclusion of Ghana from the sample, becomes
marginally statistically signiﬁcant and correctly signed- in contrast to the baseline results.
5. Instrumental Variables Analysis
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by endogeneity, in this section we employ
an instrumental variable analysis. Endogeneity can be an important issue as it is possible that
higher exposure to international markets, which may be associated with increased current
account deﬁcits, may also lead to greater democracy. In other words it may argued that the
correlation outlined in the previous section is not the outcome of a causal relationship but
the outcome of another variable that aﬀects Democracy and the Current Account Balance
alike. Endogeneity among the variables may render all our previous results invalid. To avoid
this possibility we resort to instrumental variables analysis.
To determine our instrument we follow Huntington (1993), who argues that Christianity
was a key factor in the democratization process, as the clergy played an important role against
authoritarian regimes. According to his historical account, in many countries Christian
leaders encouraged coups against authoritarian regimes during the second and the third
wave of democratization. This is attributed to the esoteric democratic message provided
by Christianity and the fact that in most cases the Christian church- at least in the period
under consideration which spans from 1945 onward- had a more distinct role from the state.
Additionally Huntington pointed to the fact the Protestant church played a key role in the
democratization process, as its structure is more democratically organized and thus has a
natural tendency to promote the democratic structure of governance.
Following the above discussion, our main instrument is the share of all Christian adherents
to Total Adherents. The variable is taken from the cross country World Religion Data
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set.15 The World Religion Dataset provides data on religious adherence worldwide from 1945
onwards. The dataset ﬁrst creates a detailed religion tree, which classiﬁes all religions and
religious families. It then uses census data or data from speciﬁc sources in order consistently
compute the total number of adherents in each religious family for each country (see Maoz and
Henderson, 2013for more details).The correlation of this variable with Democracy- is close to
50%. Interestingly enough the share of Christian adherents has a 0.01 correlation coeﬃcient
with the current account balance. Therefore a- priori it appears as a valid instrument.
Also, according to Huntington (1993) and the democratization in waves concept as well
as Persson and Tabellini (2009) and the foreign democratic capital theory, we also use the
level of democracy of the neighbors of each country as an instrument , in each year. Both
theories suggest that there is a strong positive correlation between the polity in a country
and the polity in its neighbors. Therefore we construct a variable as follows:
Zi,t =
∑
j 6=iWijDjt∑
j 6=i
Wij
where Wijis the inverse distance in kilometers of capital cities of countries i and j and
Djtis the measure as determined by the polity score of country j at time t.
As ﬁnal instrument we use the lagged values of Democracy. Furthermore, we experiment
with the share of non-religious adherents- to verify the robustness of our results.16
Table 6 presents the results from the IV estimations. In column 1 the only instrument
is the share of Christians in the country. As we can easily observe in the ﬁrst stage this
variable has a positive eﬀect on Democracy which is consistent with the above theoretical
reasoning. What is more interesting is the fact that in the second stage regression, the eﬀect
of Democracy remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant to the 1% level of statistical
15As available online on http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/WRDNATL.asp
16We have examined other instruments along the same line as well, for example the share of protestants,
share of Jewdish adherents etc. In all cases the correlation coeﬃcient with Democracywas rather lower than
the instruments used here. More importantly all tests for the validity of instruments rejected the use of this
latter set of isntruments.
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signiﬁcance. Moreover the instruments used are found statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁrst
stage, and we cannot reject the over identifying restrictions. This leads us to conclude that
the instruments used are valid. Finally note that even though the Durbin- Wu-Hausman test
provides evidence of endogeneity only at the 5% level of signiﬁcance, suggesting that even
though there are valid reasons to argue for a reverse causality among Democracy and the
current account balance, there are not conclusive (statistical) evidence to reject the simple
Fixed Eﬀects model of the previous section.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In the rest of the columns in Table 6, we examine the robustness of the IV regression
by experimenting with additional instruments. Firstly in column (2) we add the lagged
Democracy variable, then in column (3) we use the share of Christians, the lagged democracy
and the democracy in neighoring countries as instruments, in column (4) our instruments are
the lagged and the democracy of neighboring countries and ﬁnally in column (5) we do the
same as in column (4) but we also use the share of non-religious adherents as an instrument.
The results, suggest that the instrumental variable analysis we perform is robust and
give us strong empirical evidence that the relationship between the politica regime and the
current account balance of a county are indeed associated. More speciﬁc, in column (2) we
add the lagged variables of the democracy. The sing of this variable to the ﬁrst stage is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant to the 1% as we expected and second stage gives us a
statistically signﬁcant and negative relationship between the regime type and the current
account balance. In column (3) it is obvious from the ﬁrst stage that the democracy of the
neighboring countries aﬀects positively the level of democracy of a country. This is consistent
with the theory that suggests, that a country's level of democracy depends on the level of
democracy of its neighbors. What we care about is the second stage and the relationship
between democracy and the current account balance. As we can observe, although we used
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an additional instrument and not only the level of christianity, our negative relationship
remains strong at the 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance. Furthermore, in column (4), we
exclude the share of Cristians and our two instruments are only the lagged democracy and
the democracy of the neighboring countries. We do that in order to ensure that it is not
the share of christians the instrument that drives our result. It is clear that the latter does
not happen. As we can observe, the strong relationship between the level of democracy and
the current account balance remains signiﬁcant to the 1% level with the coeﬃcents of both
models to be similar.
Finally in column (5) we do a placebo test on our instrumental variable analysis by using
as an instrument a variable that is not expected to be correlated with the polity2 variable.
This is the share of non religious adeherents. As column (5) indicates this instrument is
no longer signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage regression. However, the rest of our instruments are
statistically signiﬁcant and in the second stage the negative relationship between democracy
and current account balance remains signiﬁcant.
Our ﬁnding from the instrumental variable analysis is that the main results of our empir-
ical section remain: there is a clear negative and statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship
between Democracy and the current account balance. Last but not least, the validity of
our instruments is strong as the latter are not rejected as valid instruments from our formal
tests.17
6. Conclusions
In this paper we examined the eﬀect of democracy on current account balance. Our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that democracies tend to run higher current account deﬁcits than autocracies.
These results were found to be robust across alternative speciﬁcations. This negative rela-
17The Cragg Donald test suggests that all our instruments are strong and also F test indicates that our iv
model is not weak identiﬁed.
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tionship was justiﬁed on theoretical grounds. Firstly autocratic regimes want to be insulated
by the political pressures of foreigners which may hold net foreign assets in their coun-
try. Secondly, as globalization is associated positively with democracy and current account
deﬁcits, dictatorships which are more closed run lower deﬁcits. Moreover current account
consolidations are more easily achieved in an autocratic environment, as dictators face lower
political pressures in imposing austerity measures. Finally as in democracies wages are higher
relatively to autocracies, imports are higher too and thus current account deﬁcits are higher.
Our analysis points to the severe policy constraints that current account adjustments
face. Since democracies tend to have lower current account balances, there are two important
conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, democratic countries are more prone than autocracies to face
severe problems in servicing the deﬁcits in their external sector. And this always comes with
a severe political cost. For example (Frankel 2005) and Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show
that current account problems may have severe political repercussions, by leading to changes
in the government and increase in political unrest. Then this may point to an endogenous
problems faced by democracies, by following policies that by themselves undermine the whole
political structure of the country. The second policy conclusion to be drawn is that current
account adjustments in democracies may be more diﬃcult to implement and ultimately to
be sustained in the long run. Therefore any current account adjustment program, either
designed by local governments, or international intergovernmental institutions, must always
take into account the political framework within which the problem must be tackled with.
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description mean
Standard
Deviation
Source Expected Sign
Democracy
Proxy,for Democracy
takes values from
-10(full autocracy)
to 10(full democracy)
2.20 6.97 Polity Project (-)
Cyclically Adjusted
Fiscal Balance
Policy induced changes
in ﬁscal balance calculated
as in Blachard (1990).
-0.10 2.72
World Bank Deve-
lopment Indicators
(+)
Net Foreign Assets
Assets held by foreigners
in the domestic economy.
0.12 0.72
World Bank Deve-
lopment Indicators
ambiguous
Dependency Ratio
People younger than 15
or oder than 64 to the
working age population
0.86 0.30
World Bank Deve-
lopment Indicators
(+)
Oil Rents
Measures the Rents
a country recieves from
oil production
0.46 0.30
World Bank Deve-
lopment Indicators
(+)
Openness to Trade
Imports+Exports
as percent of GDP
83.30 48.67
World Bank Deve-
lopment Indicators
(-)
Financial openness
Index variable that
codiﬁes restrictions
on cross-border
ﬁnancial transactions.
Higher values denote
more ﬁnancial openness
0.07 1.46
Chinn and Ito
2007
ambiguous
Private Credit as
percent of Gdp
Private banks credit to
the private sector
as percent of GDP
as a deviation
from the world average
43.41 43.45 Beck et al. ambiguous
Real Eﬀective
Exchange Rate
Real value of a
countrys currency against
the value of a basket of
the trading partners
of the country currencies.
4.66 0.40
Darvas
2012
(-)
Real Eﬀective
Exchange Rate Volatility
3 year Moving
Standard Deviation
of REER.
29.17 421.30
Darvas
2012
(-)
Relative Income
real GDP of country i
to a world weighted
average real GDP
28.31 25.40
World Economic
Outlook
(+)
Growth Growth Rate 1.8 4.40
World Economic
Outlook
(-)
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TABLE 2: Baseline Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline
No Time
Eﬀects
Random
Eﬀects
OLS
OLS No Time
Eﬀects
Democracy -0.660*** -0.556*** -0.161** -0.112* -0.125*
(-5.57) (-5.11) (-2.25) (-1.69) (-1.87)
Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balance 0.483*** 0.534*** 0.602*** 0.645*** 0.597***
(3.02) (3.37) (3.75) (3.13) (2.89)
Net Foreign Assets 1.689 2.152 4.171*** 6.688*** 7.045***
(1.02) (1.24) (2.93) (4.49) (4.64)
Dependency Ratio -0.194 0.510 -0.404 -1.877* -1.440
(-0.17) (0.52) (-0.38) (-1.88) (-1.45)
Growth Rate -0.259 -0.232 -0.208 -0.247* -0.293**
(-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.50) (-1.68) (-2.01)
Oilrents 0.931*** 0.923*** 0.432*** 0.381*** 0.365***
(5.66) (5.91) (5.67) (6.99) (6.82)
Openness to Trade -0.0305 -0.0243 0.000210 0.0103 0.00701
(-1.05) (-0.87) (0.01) (1.14) (0.77)
Private Credit of GDP -0.0326** -0.0180* 0.0197** 0.0438*** 0.0394***
(-2.30) (-1.67) (2.08) (5.95) (5.60)
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Volatility 0.00439 0.00692 0.0124 -0.00362 0.00227
(0.27) (0.44) (0.84) (-0.23) (0.15)
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate -2.756* -4.074*** -2.789** 0.601 0.151
(-1.72) (-2.99) (-2.42) (0.50) (0.13)
Relative Income -0.0391* -0.0276* 0.00305 0.0148 0.0322***
(-1.83) (-1.89) (0.25) (1.08) (2.85)
Financial Openness -0.312 0.162 0.296 0.267 0.240
(-0.69) (0.39) (0.88) (1.02) (0.94)
Observations 494 494 494 494 494
r2 0.326 0.295 0.345 0.412 0.399
F 8.470 5.496 11.37 15.73
F-test Country Eﬀects 5.91 5.80
F-test Time Eﬀects 3.80 2.43
Hausman Test(FE versus RE) 61.00
clustered t- statistics in parentheses. F-test country and time eﬀects denote F-test for statistical signiﬃcance of
ﬁxed country and time eﬀects.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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TABLE 3: Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polity>-9&<10 Polity>-9 Polity<10
Exclude Richest
and Poorest 10%
Exclude Richest
and Poorest 5%
Exclude Communist
Democracy -0.585*** -0.634*** -0.597*** -0.511*** -0.639*** -0.591***
(-4.47) (-5.20) (-4.72) (-3.41) (-4.90) (-4.91)
Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balance 0.753*** 0.525*** 0.677*** 0.398** 0.604*** 0.542***
(3.50) (3.08) (3.37) (2.51) (3.42) (3.18)
Net Foreign Assets -0.328 1.868 -0.439 0.971 2.379* 0.999
(-0.15) (1.08) (-0.21) (0.51) (1.72) (0.56)
Dependency Ratio 0.415 0.267 -0.350 0.292 -0.428 0.178
(0.32) (0.24) (-0.26) (0.21) (-0.37) (0.17)
Growth Rate -0.331* -0.341* -0.238 -0.253 -0.237 -0.370*
(-1.71) (-1.98) (-1.22) (-1.25) (-1.19) (-1.91)
Oilrents 0.979*** 0.962*** 0.949*** 0.785*** 0.874*** 0.944*
(5.33) (5.38) (5.56) (4.45) (5.04) (5.86)
Openness to Trade -0.0415 -0.0239 -0.0506 -0.0399 -0.0361 -0.006
(-1.22) (-0.85) (-1.45) (-0.94) (-1.10) (0.25)
Private Credit of GDP -0.0593** -0.0369** -0.0497* -0.0649*** -0.0622*** -0.031**
(-2.10) (-2.49) (-1.85) (-3.81) (-4.11) (-2.13)
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Volatility -0.0104 -0.00450 -0.00133 -0.116* 0.00257 0.002
(-0.72) (-0.29) (-0.09) (-1.73) (0.16) (0.02)
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate -0.377 -0.736 -2.900* -4.102** -2.308 -1.43
(-0.16) (-0.37) (-1.79) (-2.39) (-1.37) (-0.63)
Relative Income -0.0443 -0.0354 -0.0504 -0.0357 -0.0305 -0.022
(-1.32) (-1.60) (-1.55) (-1.00) (-1.07) (-1.29)
Financial Openness -0.219 -0.445 -0.0831 -0.673 -0.298 -0.602
(-0.34) (-0.95) (-0.14) (-1.20) (-0.58) (-1.27)
Observations 351 479 366 340 438 422
r2 0.368 0.323 0.367 0.386 0.353 0.360
F 5.841 7.394 7.022 7.535 8.014 8.70
Ftest Country Eﬀects 5.46 5.92 5.42 5.08 5.53 6.82
Ftest Time Eﬀects 2.54 4.53 1.80 2.64 3.51 4.17
clustered t- statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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TABLE 4: Sensitivity Analysis
(1)
Freedom House
Democracy
(2)
Terms of Trade
Volatility
(3)
GDP per Capita
(4)
Fiscal Balance
(5)
Oil
Freedom House -13.37***
(-4.35)
Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balance 0.502*** 0.500** 0.467*** 0.351
(3.12) (2.60) (2.80) (1.408)
Net Foreign Assets 1.187 1.127 1.223 0.898 -1.265
(0.69) (0.62) (0.67) (0.55) (-0.388)
Dependency Ratio -0.487 -1.065 -0.231 -0.429 -0.357
(-0.41) (-0.96) (-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.34)
Growth Rate -0.232 -0.239 -0.322* -0.188 0.009
(-1.34) (-1.35) (-1.84) (-1.00) (0.058)
Oilrents 0.832*** 0.905*** 0.946*** 0.955*** 0.954***
(5.20) (4.28) (5.74) (6.52) (4.35)
Openness to Trade -0.0273 -0.0230 -0.0310 -0.0295 0.026
(-0.96) (-0.77) (-1.06) (-0.92) (0.785)
Private Credit of GDP -0.0229 -0.0312** -0.0391*** -0.0361** -0.006
(-1.65) (-2.29) (-2.69) (-2.41) (-0.225)
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Volatility 0.00410 0.00571 -0.134** 0.072
(0.25) (0.40) (-2.02) (0.735)
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate -2.784 -4.126** -2.689* -3.373* -2.509
(-1.53) (-2.23) (-1.66) (-1.88) (-1.390)
Relative Income -0.0405* -0.0485** -0.0496** -0.062**
(-1.90) (-2.15) (-2.01) (-2.184)
Financial Openness -0.319 -0.257 -0.417 -0.130 0.148
(-0.72) (-0.55) (-1.01) (-0.24) (0.252)
Democracy -0.594*** -0.639*** -0.668*** -0.257**
(-4.72) (-5.26) (-4.16) (-2.266)
terms of trade volatility -8.57e-14 -7.45e-14
(-1.16) (-1.41)
Gdp Per Capita 2.168 2.221
(1.54) (1.52)
Fiscal Balance 0.00587 0.00476
(0.44) (0.25)
Observations 490 451 490 445 229
r2 0.311 0.323 0.329 0.359 0.273
F 7.954 . 8.407 8.977 5.15
Ftest Country Eﬀects 5.73 6.07 5.50 5.91 8.00
Ftest Time Eﬀects 2.90 4.27 4.28 3.42 4.31
clustered t- statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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TABLE 5: Jackknife Estimation
Country
Min
Coef.
Country
Max
Coef.
Democracy Indonesia -0.70*** Sudan -0.60***
Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Balance Sudan 0.38*** Ireland 0.55***
Net Foreign Assets Ghana 1.03 Liberia 3.07***
Dependency Ratio Jamaica -0.63*** Azerbaijan 0.30
Growth Rate Paraguay -0.33* Chile -1.68
Oil Rents Sudan 0.83*** Nigeria 0.99***
Openness to Trade Ireland -0.40*** Azerbaijan -0.02
Private Credit as Percent of GDP Israel -0.04 Portugal -0.03**
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Volatility Ghana -0.10* Sudan 0.13
Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Ghana -3.55** Uzbekistan -1.22
Relative Income Ghana -0.49** Azerbaijan -0.24
Financial Openness Azerbaijan -0.46 Malaysia -0.07
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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TABLE 6: IV Regressions
(1)
Instr.Christians
(2)
Instr. Christians
Democracy(-1)
(3)
Instr.Democracy(-1)
Christians
Neighboor
Democracy
(4)
Instr.
Democracy (-1)
Neighboor
Democracy
(5)
Instr.
NonReligious
Democracy(-1)
Neighboor
Democracy
Democracy -1.656*** -1.427*** -1.288*** -1.298*** -1.268***
(-3.11) (-3.64) (-3.58) (-3.50) (-3.48)
Cyclically Adjusted Budget 0.406*** 0.411*** 0.427*** 0.426*** 0.428***
Balance (2.67) (2.87) (3.01) (3.00) (3.02)
Net Foreign Assets 2.712* 1.466 2.543* 2.545* 2.538*
(1.89) (1.03) (1.94) (1.94) (1.94)
Dependency Ratio -0.922 -0.498 -0.362 -0.366 -0.354
(-0.85) (-0.47) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.34)
Growth Rate -0.207 -0.299* -0.294* -0.294* -0.293*
(-1.19) (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.66)
Oil rents 1.138*** 1.058*** 1.042*** 1.044*** 1.038***
(4.99) (5.21) (5.16) (5.17) (5.14)
Openness to trade -0.0247 -0.0308 -0.0323 -0.0324 -0.0323
(-0.96) (-1.21) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.25)
Private credit -0.0323** -0.0511*** -0.0471*** -0.0473*** -0.0467***
as percent of gdp (-2.23) (-3.09) (-2.96) (-2.96) (-2.94)
Real Eﬀective -0.0164 -0.0327 -0.0308 -0.0310 -0.0304
Exchange Rate (-0.82) (-1.31) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.20)
Real Eﬀective Exchange -3.936** -4.420** -4.230** -4.234** -4.221**
Rate Volatility (-2.55) (-2.12) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-2.03)
Relative Income -0.0622*** -0.0461** -0.0436** -0.0436** -0.0437**
(-3.31) (-2.31) (-2.20) (-2.20) (-2.20)
Financial Openness 0.00501 -0.468 -0.411 -0.413 -0.407
(0.01) (-1.10) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.96)
First stage
Share of Christians 9.30*** 5.38*** 4.14**
(3.32) (2.65 ) (1.95)
Lagged Democracy 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.30***
(5.14) (5.62) (5.13) (5.34)
Neighboor Democracy 0.72** 0.8** 0.78**
(2.21) (2.41) (2.39)
Share of NonReligious -2.16
(-1.43)
Observations 489 469 463 463 463
R2 0.154 0.262 0.290 0.288 0.293
F 4.206 4.567 5.021 5.010 5.038
DWH 4.328** 6.073** 4.907** 7.30 *** 3.834**
Cragg Donald test 16.552*** 40.763*** 28.792*** 41.246*** 27.714***
F-test Instr. 11.02** 19.62*** 13.26 *** 18.44*** 13.09 ***
clustered t- statistics in parentheses. DWH is the Durbin- Wu- Hausman Test of endogeneity of the regressors.Rejection of the null suggests that the IV regression is required.
Cragg Donald F statistic is a weak idendiﬁcation test for the model. Null hypothesis indicates that the model is weak idendiﬁed. F-test Instr. denotes the test for excluded
instruments.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
